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Abstract 
 
 
In 2007 Slovenia launched a comprehensive reform of its tax system. This article presents an 
analysis of several envisaged tax and structural reform scenarios including the flat tax proposal 
with a dynamic general equilibrium model of the Slovenian economy. We focus mainly on the 
macroeconomic and welfare aspects of the proposed scenarios, thus capturing the overall effect 
on individual taxpayers and the government budget. The main characteristics of the model are 
presented along with the results of different reform scenarios, including the one that finally 
passed the parliament and now forms part of Slovenia’s tax system. Our results suggest that 
options other than the flat tax system are better suited to the country’s long-term economic 
development. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
A significant part of Slovenia’s current tax system was formed at the start of 1990, including 
the new personal income tax (PIT) and new corporate income tax (CIT). During the 1990s few 
changes were introduced to both taxes, while in 2004 new PIT and CIT laws were passed by 
parliament, coming into effect in January 20053. However, freshly accepted tax codes were 
already changed with amendments in 2004 and 2005. In addition, during 2006 completely new 
PIT and CIT tax codes were prepared, which have been effective since January 2007. For the 
purposes of this last tax reform a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model was 
constructed (Bayar et al., 2006). The models was used to determine the effects of different tax 
combinations on the income position of households, as well as on the long-term 
macroeconomic position of the economy (cf. Šušteršič et al., 2005; Government of the 
Republic of Slovenia, 2005). The results of different scenarios shall be presented in this article. 
 
At the same time, a wide public discussion was going on regarding the tax reform in Slovenia. 
Its basis was the claim that the Slovenian tax system experiences a relatively high taxation of 
labour and an intransparent and complicated set of tax codes, which are difficult to implement. 
The fact is that wages in Slovenia are taxed not only with a 38.2% rate of social security 
contributions, but also with a payroll tax (with progressive marginal tax rates of between 0% 
and 14.8%). This combination of the PIT, social security contributions and the payroll tax 
effectively classifies Slovenia among those countries with the highest taxes on labour in the 
EU. The discussion in Slovenia mostly focused on the Slovakian example, which introduced a 
flat-tax system of the PIT with a single tax rate of 19% in 2004. The idea of a tax system 
similar to Slovakian, which was even included among the official government reform proposals 
(Government Office for Growth, 2005), triggered a sharp response of labour unions in 
Slovenia, mainly due to the fear of replacement of the existing double VAT rate system (with a 
reduced 8.5% and standard 20% rate) with a single VAT rate. At last, the flat tax reform was 
rejected in Slovenia in favour of a new three-tax-bracket PIT code and an altered CIT code. 
 
                                                 
3 The PIT code differed from the system which was valid during the 1990s by its higher allowances for children, 
its broader tax base and the fact that it was based on the worldwide income concept, while the CIT code has 
introduced several new elements regarding the international aspects of the environment, which Slovenia 
encountered with its EU membership in 2004. 
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 The main objective of the article is thus to quantify the potential impacts of several envisaged 
tax and structural reform scenarios using the dynamic general equilibrium model of the 
Slovenian economy (SloMod). The model and the simulations take into account all the 
fundamental mechanisms and the structure of the Slovenian economy, as well as all the 
important elements of the structural and tax reforms, the reform of social transfers, changes of 
the government expenditures, as well as the volume and structure of financial flows between 
the Slovenian and EU budgets. Different combinations of taxes shall be considered in the 
counterfactual simulation scenarios in order to establish the economic sustainability of the 
proposed tax reform in Slovenia, i.e. to ascertain whether the Slovakian-like flat tax system or 
some other type of taxation is better suited to the country’s long-term economic development. 
 
The outline of the article is as follows. In Chapter 2 a short description of the computable 
general equilibrium model of the Slovenian economy is presented, while the developments in 
the Slovenian tax system in relation to the proposed flat tax reform are explained in some detail 
in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4 we give a comparative overview of the simulation scenarios. In 
Chapters 5 and 6 the simulation results of the model are presented, with special focus on the 
long-term macroeconomic position of the economy and the effects of different tax 
combinations on welfare levels. In the final chapter we summarize the central findings of the 
article. 
 
2. Description of the CGE Model of the Slovenian Economy 
 
The modelling platform of the Slovenian economy is represented by a dynamic multi-sectoral 
and multi-household computable general equilibrium model, based on social accounting matrix 
(SAM) for the year 2004 (cf. Bayar et al., 2006). The model SloMod incorporates the economic 
behaviour of households, firms, government and the foreign sector. All economic agents are 
assumed to adopt an optimizing behaviour under relevant budget constraints and all markets 
operate under the perfect competition assumption. The model embodies considerable detail on 
the nature of production and demand in the economy and can thus be used to analyse a vast 
range of issues; either broad in scope or household - and industry-specific. 
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 Five households with respect to income are distinguished in SloMod. Each quintile receives a 
share of capital income, labour income, mixed income4, and transfers from the government, the 
firms and the EU. Taxable income is further derived for each quintile by taking into account the 
share of income that is subject to personal income tax. Households pay the PIT to the 
government and save a fixed fraction of net income. Their propensity to save is endogenous 
and reacts to changes in the after-tax average return to capital. The optimal allocation between 
the consumption commodities is given by optimizing a Stone-Geary utility function in the 
context of a linear expenditure system (LES), which represents a set of consumer demand 
equations linear in total expenditure (cf. Geary, 1950; Stone, 1954). To evaluate the overall 
change in consumer welfare by quintile we use the equivalent variation5 in income, which is 
based on the concept of a money metric indirect utility function (Varian, 1992). 
 
The model distinguishes twenty perfectly competitive production sectors consisting of both 
public and private enterprises. There are twenty types of commodities, where each sector 
produces one or several types of them. The producers operate on perfectly competitive markets 
and maximize profits to determine optimal levels of inputs and output. Furthermore, production 
prices equal average and marginal costs, a condition that implies profit maximization for a 
constant-returns-to-scale technology. The optimal allocation between different types of private 
investment commodities is given by optimizing a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Changes in 
inventories are modelled as a fixed share out of supply of commodities. Treated at an aggregate 
level, firms’ savings are given by the net operating surplus less transfers by the firms to the 
households and to the foreign sector. 
 
Gross output for each sector is determined from a nested production structure. Producers are 
assumed to choose intermediate inputs and the mixed factor6 bundle according to a Leontief 
production function, and the optimal level of labour, capital and mixed factor is chosen 
according to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function. Labour is differentiated 
according to the level of education in three skill groups; unskilled labour, skilled labour and 
highly skilled labour. Substitution possibilities between labour by skill type are reflected by 
                                                 
4 The mixed income corresponds to remuneration for work carried out by the owner or members of his family 
which cannot be distinguished from his profits as entrepreneur. 
5 Equivalent variation measures the income needed to make the household as well off as in the new counterfactual 
equilibrium evaluated at benchmark prices. The equivalent variation is positive for welfare gains from the policy 
scenario and negative for losses (cf. Harrison and Kriström, 1999). 
6 The mixed factor is a composite of labour and capital of the unincorporated enterprises. 
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 another CES function. Labour market by skill type is closed by changes in unemployment. The 
latter introduces rigidities in the labour markets. The responsiveness of real wage rates to the 
labour market conditions is modelled by a wage curve, while the behaviour of labour supply is 
determined through a labour supply curve. Wage differentials of the wage curve are derived as 
the ratio between the wage rate by sector and skill and the average wage rate by skill level 
(Derviş et al., 1982), while the labour supply curve assumes a positive correlation between the 
domestic labour supply and the real average net wage rate. 
 
Due to the homogeneity of degree zero in prices, the model only determines relative prices. In 
this case, the GDP deflator is chosen as the numéraire price level against which all relative 
prices in the model are measured. Consumption is valued at consumer prices, which 
incorporate trade and transport margins, excise duties, the value added tax, other taxes on 
consumption, and take into account subsidies on consumption. The consumer price index used 
in the model is of the Laspeyres type. The model accounts for a detailed cost structure at 
sectoral level, including taxes on intermediate consumption, labour, capital and the mixed 
factor. Firms pay corporate income tax to the government on the net profits and trade and 
transport margins on the intermediate consumption. Actually, the trade and transport margins 
are paid on all categories of demand in SloMod, except the government consumption. For the 
trade and transport services the sum of the demand should be equal to the total supply of the 
commodity from imports and domestic production (cf. Löfgren et al., 2002). With regard to 
labour SloMod accounts for the social security contributions paid by the employees and by the 
employers, and for the payroll taxes. 
 
The specification of foreign trade is based on the small open economy assumption, i.e. with no 
influence on world market prices. Three main groups of trading partners are distinguished in 
the model; the EU15, the EU9 (new EU member states) and the rest of the world (ROW). The 
Armington (1969) assumption of limited substitution possibilities between domestically 
produced and imported goods is adopted in the model. Domestic consumers use composite 
goods of imported and domestically produced goods according to a CES function. Limited 
substitution possibilities are also assumed to exist between goods produced for the domestic 
market and exports, captured by a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function. 
 
Total government revenues consist of excise duties, the value added tax and other taxes on 
products, personal income taxes, social security contributions paid by the employees, 
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 employers and self-employed, payroll taxes, corporate taxes, other taxes on production and 
transfers from the EU. Total government expenditures are given by the subsidies on products 
and on production, transfers to households, the EU and the ROW, gross capital fixed formation 
and current consumption. The transfers to the households include unemployment benefits, 
pensions, and social, family and other transfers differentiated by quintile and level of education 
(highly skilled, skilled and unskilled). 
 
Due to the complexity of the model, a combination of consistent closure rules is needed. In 
order to achieve the clearing of the labour markets, inter-sectoral mobility of labour is assumed 
for each skill group. On the capital market the sectoral capital stock is exogenously fixed, thus 
introducing rigidities. The investment is assumed to adjust to the available domestic and 
foreign savings. This reflects an economy in which savings form a binding constraint, while the 
interest rate is assumed to effectively balance the supply and demand for investments. This 
macro closure rule is neoclassical in spirit, though the fact that the model allows for 
unemployment introduces a Keynesian element. Government total expenditures are fixed as a 
share of GDP, whereas government deficit adjusts. The transfers between Slovenia and the 
foreign sector, and the labour income from non-residential firms were exogenously fixed in real 
terms. The exchange rate is fixed, while the deficit of the current account adjusts. 
 
SloMod has a recursive dynamic structure composed of a sequence of several temporary 
equilibria. The first equilibrium in the sequence is given by the benchmark year. In each time 
period, the model is solved for an equilibrium given the exogenous conditions assumed for that 
particular period. The equilibria are connected to each other through capital accumulation. 
Thus, the endogenous determination of investment behaviour is essential for the dynamic part 
of the model. Investment and capital accumulation in a given year depend on expected rates of 
return for the subsequent year, which are determined by actual returns on capital in the current 
year. The expected rate of return required to maintain indefinitely the current rate of capital 
growth was specified as an inverse logistic function of the proportionate growth in capital stock 
(cf. Dixon and Rimmer, 2002). The maximum possible growth rate of sector-specific capital 
stock is being set in order to avoid unrealistically large simulated growth rates. The weighted 
average return to capital has been taken as a proxy for the real interest rate in SloMod, where 
the return to capital is expressed in real terms using the production price index. The model was 
built within the general algebraic modelling system (GAMS, 2006) and solved with an 
appropriate algorithm in annual steps. 
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 3. Developments in the Slovenian Tax System and the Flat Tax 
 
Slovenia started with the introduction of a tax system similar to the one of EU countries at the 
beginning of 1990s, when (among other taxes) new corporate income tax and personal income 
tax was adopted. At the beginning of 2005 a completely new PIT code (PIT-2005) came into 
effect, answering the changed socioeconomic circumstances, Supreme Court rulings7 from 
1990s and the fact that Slovenia joined the EU in May 2004. Compared with the PIT system, 
which was valid through 1990s, the PIT-2005 code included higher allowances for children, a 
broader tax base, and it was based on the worldwide income concept. However, the code 
retained progressive tax schedule with five tax brackets, marginal tax rates between 16% and 
50%, and several tax allowances. Together with the new PIT-2005 code, a new CIT-2005 code 
came into effect in January 2005, bringing elements necessary for the EU membership, while it 
retained the 25% statutory CIT rate. 
 
At the same time, a public discussion emerged in Slovenia regarding the further steps of 
possible tax reforms. Additional reform steps were defended by claims that the tax system 
needed substantial simplification and especially the reduction of taxation on labour, where 
Slovenia held relatively high position in comparison with the other EU member states. Total 
taxes on labour represented on average 18.5% of GDP in EU-25 in 2004 (15.9% in EU-10 – 
new EU member states), while in Slovenia this share reached 21.6% of GDP (European 
Commission, 2006). Such a high share was a sum of the PIT, social security contributions and 
the payroll tax8. The implicit tax rate on employed labour in Slovenia (37.8%) also exceeded 
the EU-25 average of 35.9% (34.7% in the EU-10). Among different publicly debated 
proposals of the tax reform the idea that predominated, and was even included on the list of 
proposed government reforms (cf. Government Office for Growth, 2005), was the one of a flat 
tax system. 
 
                                                 
7 During the 1990s the Supreme Court rulings demanded changes in the PIT code, especially higher tax allowances for 
children, which was finally implemented in the PIT-2005 code. 
8 Between 1992 and 1996 Slovenia reduced the rate of social security contributions from 50.35% to 40.22%. To retain the 
government revenue, the payroll tax was introduced simultaneously in 1996, with marginal tax rates between 1% and 10% 
(later increased to 3.8% – 14.8%). Compared with the social security contributions, which taxed all wages irrespective to 
their size, the payroll tax was introduced only to wages above certain threshold (530 EUR at the time of introduction). 
Through this mechanism the government reduced the tax burden for low-wage industries (mainly the textile and the metal 
industry) which faced several problems after the collapse of ex-Yugoslavian markets. Gradually, the payroll tax became 
rather important income source, representing EUR 472.3 million in 2004 (1.9% of GDP or 4.4% of general government 
revenue) (Ministry of Finance, 2007). As a part of the 2005-2006 tax reform package, the payroll tax was abolished by a 
special law in 2005. 
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 The original flat tax idea of Hall and Rabushka (1985) includes an integrated expenditure tax 
system with cash flow business tax and connected wage tax, both using the same (single) tax 
rate. Tax base at the corporate level is the same as the base of expenditure type VAT, i.e. value 
of sales minus value of purchases (including investments) and wages. Tax base at the 
individual taxpayer level is equal to wages (labour income) with a uniform fixed tax allowance. 
So far, no country has entirely implemented this concept in practice. Thus nowadays the term 
“flat tax” is used to identify a family of personal income tax systems with one common 
characteristic, i.e. a single positive marginal tax rate on labour income (Keen, 2006), while 
those tax systems are rather different regarding other characteristics, such as width of the tax 
base and tax allowances). 
 
First personal income tax systems with a single tax rate were introduced in the first half of 20th 
century in Jersey (1940), Guernsey (1940) and Hog Kong (1947), while the real era of flat tax 
started after the collapse of the socialism, when several CEE countries chose this option9. A 
special attention was given to Russia, so far the biggest country with flat-tax, where the tax 
reform was adopted in 2001. Crucial part of the reform was a replacement of three marginal tax 
rates between 12% and 30% with a single 13% flat rate. In Russia, the reform led to an increase 
of collected PIT revenue, even though it is not possible to prove that this increase is solely due 
to the flat tax itself (Ivanova et al., 2005). In some other countries, e.g. in Slovakia (cf. Krajčir 
and Odor, 2005), the flat tax was also generally introduced as a part of a wider tax reform, 
including broadening the tax base, abolishment of exemptions and reduction of compliance 
costs. 
 
The general improvement in the functioning of the tax system is a combination of several 
elements, while ceteris paribus the replacement of a progressive PIT schedule with a single PIT 
rate leads to the immediate redistribution of tax burden among the taxpayers under the 
assumption of fiscal neutrality. On the other hand it also leads to the decrease of government 
revenue under the assumption of relatively low single PIT rate which would not put any 
taxpayer in a worse position compared with the “old” progressive PIT schedule. These 
consequences were confirmed e.g. for Germany (Peichl, 2006), Denmark (Larsen, 2006), and 
Netherlands (Camida and Goudswaard, 2001). It seems that these are main reasons why no one 
                                                 
9 So far the flat-tax was introduced in several CEE countries (International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, 
2006): Estonia (1994), Latvia (1994), Lithuania (1994), Russia (2001), Slovakia (2004), Ukraine (2004), Serbia 
(2003), Georgia (2005) and Romania (2005). 
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 country with “mature” (and well functioning) tax system has introduced the flat tax yet. On the 
other hand it is suitable in cases where the tax system is still to be developed and where the 
taxes are not “infected” with decade’s long influences of different interest groups and subtle 
policy measures resulting in a fragile social equilibrium. Under such circumstances it is 
difficult to introduce a flat-tax reform that would substantially change the income position of an 
important share of taxpayers (voters). 
 
The Slovenian flat tax version, as firstly proposed, resembled the Slovakian tax system. Since 
2004, Slovakia had a single PIT rate (of 19%) with limited set of allowances and the same and 
only one tax rate (19%) for VAT and the same rate (19%) for the CIT. Similar proposal with a 
PIT flat-tax rate of (presupposed) 20% and the same single rate (20%) for VAT (instead of 
actual 8.5% and 20% rates) and CIT (instead of actual 25% rate), combined with an immediate 
removal of payroll tax was widely discussed in media and received rather mixed responses in 
Slovenia, even before any projections of consequences were prepared. While it was welcomed 
by representatives of some big corporations (who were convinced that Slovakian-like-reform 
would reduce overall tax burden paid by corporations and increased their international 
competitiveness) it was sharply rejected by labour unions, mostly due to possible replacement 
of the existing VAT rates (reduced 8.5% and standard 20% rate) with a single (presupposed) 
20% VAT rate, and to a lesser extend due to the possible shift of PIT burden from high income 
taxpayers toward mid and low income individuals. 
 
In 2005 the new government (elected in autumn 2004) established a commission of tax experts 
coordinated by the ex-minister of finance (Mr. Marko Kranjec), which prepared some changes 
in existing PIT, CIT and tax procedure code. A major part of its proposals passed the 
parliament in December 2005 in forms of amendments to the existing PIT, CIT and tax 
procedure codes. Amendments brought several simplifications in the existing tax system as 
well as a schedular taxation of capital income inside the PIT. Namely, interest, capital gains 
and dividends were separated from other personal income subject to tax and taxed separately 
with a single rate of 20%. In addition, a payroll tax was abolished by special law accepted in 
December 2005 and thus it is being gradually removed from the tax system in annual steps by 
2009 to avoid too big disturbances to the fiscal equilibrium. In 2006 a wide political, public and 
professional discussions continued regarding further steps of the reform. Beside the 
calculations made by the Ministry of Finance (2006) and Cajner et al. (2006), a thorough in-
depth study was prepared by the Institute for Economic Research (cf. Bayar et al., 2006), where 
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 different counterfactual scenarios were examined. An overview of results of the latter study 
will be given in the present article. 
 
Based on the prepared simulations and political negotiations, as a final step of the tax reform a 
completely new PIT, CIT and tax procedure codes10 passed the parliament at the end of 2006 
and are effective from January 2007 (thereafter PIT-2007, CIT-2007). Slovenia finally did not 
accept the flat-tax. The PIT-2007 code indeed includes several simplifications compared with 
the previous code, while it still retains three tax brackets with marginal tax rates of 16%, 27% 
and 41% (presented also in the present article), as well as most of the “old” tax allowances. The 
statutory CIT rate decreased in CIT-2007 to 20% (from previous 25%), while several tax 
allowances are abolished. The final influence on effective CIT rate thus depends on individual 
company characteristics, while the CIT revenue neutrality is preserved. 
 
4. Comparative Overview of the Scenarios 
 
To begin with, we have the so-called baseline (or business as usual – BAU) scenario referring 
to the assumption that the Slovenian economy is on the steady state equilibrium growth path, 
where all the real variables and nominal incomes are growing at the 4% steady-state growth 
rate. This scenario represents the base for comparison of the other scenarios. Then we have the 
reference scenario (REF), which includes all the tax reforms except the proposed corporate 
income tax and personal income tax changes, which are finally analyzed in five counterfactual 
scenarios (SC1–SC5). The scenarios will be briefly describer hereinafter, while their overview 
is given in Table 1. 
                                                 
10 Besides the changes in these major taxes, other, less important tax codes were also subject to revisions, e.g. the 
inheritance and gift tax. 
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 Table 1. Summary of the scenario assumptions used for simulations 
 
Scenario category Reference scenario Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5 
Marginal PIT rates 16%, 33%, 37%, 41% & 50% 22% 25% 15% & 25% 15%, 25% & 35% 16%, 27% & 41% 
- tax brackets (in SIT)                 0 -   1,300,000  16%      
   1,300,000 -   2,540,000  33%      
   2,540,000 -   5,140,000  37%                  0 - 1,300,000  15%               0 - 1,629,552  16% 
   5,140,000 - 10,330,000  41%                 0 - 1,300,000  15% 1,300,000 - 4,800,000  25% 1,629,552 - 3,529,104  27% 
 10,330,000 -                     50%   1,300,000 -                   25% 4,800,000 -                   35% 3,529,104 -                   41% 
PIT allowances       
- general allowance 591,900 SIT 750,000 SIT 1,000,000 SIT 750,000 SIT 750,000 SIT 670,992 SIT 
- children allowance1 structured structured structured structured structured structured 
- supplementary pension 
  insurance 
max. 24% of contributions 
& less than 549,400 SIT 
max. 24% of contrib. & 
less than 549,400 SIT 
max. 24% of contrib. 
& less than 549,400 SIT
max. 24% of contributions 
& less than 549,400 SIT 
max. 24% of contributions 
& less than 549,400 SIT 
max. 24% of contributions 
& less than 549,400 SIT 
- pensioner allowance 14.5% 14.5% 14.5% 14.5% 14.5% 13.5% 
- allowance for self-employed 
  in culture and journalism 900,000 SIT 0 SIT 0 SIT 0 SIT 0 SIT 900,000 SIT 
- student work allowance 1,200,000 SIT 0 SIT 0 SIT 0 SIT 0 SIT 670,992 SIT 
- seniority allowance 275,300 SIT 0 SIT 0 SIT 0 SIT 0 SIT 0 SIT 
- disabled persons allowance 3,441,500 SIT 3,441,500 SIT 3,441,500 SIT 3,441,500 SIT 3,441,500 SIT 3,441,500 SIT 
- special allowance2 max. 2% (4%) of the tax base 0 SIT 0 SIT 0 SIT 0 SIT 0 SIT 
PIT standardized costs       
- contractual work 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
- student work 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
- rents 40% 20% 20% 20% 20% 25% 
- royalties 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 10% 
Income tax rate for the 
interests, dividends and profits 
 
20% 
 
20% 
 
20% 
 
20% 
 
20% 
 
20% 
Payroll tax3 abolished by 2009 abolished by 2009 abolished by 2009 abolished by 2009 abolished by 2009 abolished by 2009 
Marginal CIT rate 25% 22% 25% 25% 25% 20% 
- allowances4 same as in 2006 same as in 2006 same as in 2006 same as in 2006 same as in 2006 reduced 
Value added tax 8.5% and 20% 8.5% and 20% 8.5% and 20% 8.5% and 20% 8.5% and 20% 8.5% and 20% 
Social security contributions 38.2% 38.2% 38.2% 38.2% 38.2% 38.2% 
Share of government 
 spending in GDP 
reduced by 4% till 2012 
(by 2% till 2008) 
reduced by 4% till 2012 
(by 2% till 2008) 
reduced by 4% till 2012 
(by 2% till 2008) 
reduced by 4% till 2012 
(by 2% till 2008) 
reduced by 4% till 2012 
(by 2% till 2008) 
reduced by 4% till 2012 
(by 2% till 2008) 
 
Notes: 
1 The children allowance amounts to 474.900 SIT for the first child, to 516.200 SIT for the second child, and to 688.300 SIT for the third child. 
2 The special allowance is defined as the sum of a taxpayer’s expenses for selected purchases such as the acquisition of books or government securities. 
3 The payroll tax is being gradually abolished by 2009. In different scenarios a relevant (diminishing) annual rate of the tax was used. 
4 The CIT allowances mostly include allowances for R&D, additional (voluntary) pension insurance and the employment of selected categories of employees. 
 
Source: Bayar et al. (2006, p. 12); Chamber of Accountants, Financials and Auditors of Slovenia (2007). 
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 Within the reference scenario several assumptions regarding the planned reforms, as well 
as some already initiated changes in particular areas were taken into account. Firstly, we 
took into account the changes within the tax system, which were introduced between 2004 
and 2006: a) decrease of the payroll tax rates, which started in the year 2006 (with a 20% 
decrease) and will be concluded in the year 2009 with complete elimination of the payroll 
tax, b) changes in the PIT system (tax rates, income brackets, expenses, relieves, pensions, 
and new treatment of the income from capital), and c) changes in the CIT system (changed 
tax base and relieves). Secondly, we considered other changes, planned within the 
structural reform package, e.g. government deficit and expenditures, government transfers 
to the households, financial flows between Slovenian and the EU budget, government 
expenditures for R&D and tertiary education, and consequent changes in the total factor 
productivity (TFP) growth. 
 
We assumed that the government total expenditure will decrease by two percentage points 
of GDP between 2007 and 2008, and by another two percentage points of GDP within the 
period 2009-2012. Regarding government deficit we assumed that it will be eliminated by 
the year 2010. Transfers to households (pensions, maternity and sickness leave) were 
indexed to wages, while the other transfers (e.g. scholarship, housing subsidies and social 
assistance) were indexed to the CPI. Unemployment benefits were endogenously 
determined within the model. Increased expenditures for R&D and education were taken 
into account for estimation of the change in the TFP growth. The reference scenario also 
assumes that the exchange rate is fixed and that foreign savings are adjusting. Furthermore, 
we assumed that the VAT rates remain the same, and the compensation is achieved 
through public deficits or surpluses. 
 
In the group of counterfactual scenarios, specific tax reform characteristics were added to 
the reference scenario. The differences between these counterfactual scenarios are the 
result of different assumptions regarding the changes in the PIT and the CIT system. The 
first two counterfactual scenarios (SC1 and SC2) represent the flat-tax PIT system11, since 
they employ a single marginal tax rate of 22% and 25%, respectively, while the other three 
counterfactual scenarios retain tax schedules with two or more tax brackets. However, all 
of them include scheduler 20% taxation of interest, capital gains and dividends. The 
                                                 
11 It should be emphasized again that the term ‘flat-tax’ only refers to the PIT in the Slovenian case and has 
no similarities with the broader concept of Hall and Rabushka (1995). 
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 counterfactual scenario SC5 represents the actually accepted PIT code (PIT-2007) and CIT 
code (CIT-2007), which were passed by the Slovenian parliament in 2006 and have been 
effective since January 2007. 
 
The counterfactual scenarios also differ regarding the number of tax allowances and the 
actually accepted solution (scenario SC5) includes the same tax allowances as the 
reference system, with slightly modified values. Regarding the CIT, the scenarios differ 
from the reference system in terms of the size of the statutory tax rate and tax allowances. 
The finally accepted solution (scenario SC5) thus reduces the statutory rate from 25% to 
20%, as well as the tax allowances. The assumptions regarding other characteristics do not 
change between scenarios; the VAT rates remain constant at the existing 8.5% and 20%, 
while the rate of social security contributions remains at the reference level of 38.2%. The 
share of total government expenditures in GDP remains to be reduced by 2% by 2008 and 
by an additional 2% by 2012. Expenditures on R&D and tertiary education were assumed 
to increase according to the Lisbon Strategy targets (cf. Government of the Republic of 
Slovenia, 2005). 
 
5. Macroeconomic Results of the Simulations 
 
In this chapter we provide an analysis of the macroeconomic simulations given the 
assumptions of scenarios presented in Chapter 4. The simulation results demonstrate that in 
the long term Slovenia would have a budget surplus, which is certainly needed due to the 
predicted deterioration of government finance sustainability, caused by the negative effects 
of its aging population. The results show that each one of the scenarios could generate 
considerably more economic growth than the baseline case, but attention must be drawn to 
the fact that the most important growth generator is the total factor productivity, which is 
dependant on the (successful) implementation of policy measures within the Lisbon 
Strategy. 
 
5.1. Reference Scenario 
 
Taking into account the results of the reference scenario, Slovenia’s real GDP compared to 
the baseline case would be 13.4% higher in 2013 and 25.2% higher in 2025 (see Table 2). 
Productivity growth shifts the production capacities of the Slovenian economy upward, as 
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 well as the annual growth rate, which increases to 5.5% on average during the 2007-2013 
transition period and remains at 5.1% per year on average during the entire 2007-2025 
period. Due to higher productivity, savings, and investment, the real private GDP would 
increase even faster, since its level compared to the baseline case would be 18.5% higher 
in 2013 and 31% higher in 2025 (see Table 10). 
 
Table 2. Real GDP (percentage change in comparison to BAU) 
Scenario 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2020 2025 
Reference scenario 4.06 5.37 7.30 8.96 10.69 12.13 13.41 21.19 25.19 
Scenario SC1 4.35 5.70 7.60 9.23 10.92 12.34 13.58 21.31 25.29 
Scenario SC2 4.34 5.69 7.58 9.20 10.89 12.30 13.54 21.24 25.21 
Scenario SC3 4.43 5.79 7.66 9.27 10.94 12.33 13.55 21.20 25.16 
Scenario SC4 4.37 5.73 7.60 9.21 10.89 12.29 13.52 21.18 25.15 
Scenario SC5 4.22 5.55 7.45 9.09 10.79 12.22 13.47 21.20 25.19 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod; own calculations. 
 
Investment would increase by 22.4% in 2013 and by 31.2% in 2025 thanks to higher total 
savings and necessary increases in production capacity (see Table 3). The state budget 
would have a surplus of 2.4% of the GDP, and household savings compared to the baseline 
case would increase by more than 20% in 2013 and by more than 30% in 2025 (see Table 
11). Domestic production would expand in all industries (see Table 4). The increase in 
domestic output compared to the baseline case would exceed 30% in 2025 in 
manufacturing and 27% in services. The expansion would be much lower for agriculture 
(20.1%) and public services (8.1%). 
 
Table 3. Real investment (percentage change in comparison to BAU) 
Scenario 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2020 2025 
Reference scenario 7.67 9.88 11.27 13.75 17.11 19.95 22.44 29.00 31.23 
Scenario SC1 4.33 7.07 8.46 10.98 14.38 17.27 19.80 26.79 29.26 
Scenario SC2 3.83 6.60 7.98 10.50 13.90 16.78 19.31 26.31 28.78 
Scenario SC3 1.94 4.97 6.34 8.88 12.30 15.20 17.74 24.96 27.55 
Scenario SC4 2.65 5.57 6.94 9.47 12.88 15.77 18.30 25.44 27.98 
Scenario SC5 4.95 7.54 8.93 11.45 14.85 17.73 20.26 27.22 29.68 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod; own calculations. 
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 Table 4. Domestic production (percentage change in comparison to BAU) 
Industry Year REF SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 
2013 11.81 12.06 12.05 12.14 12.09 11.99 
2020 17.52 18.05 18.09 18.33 18.23 17.92 Agriculture 
2025 20.12 20.69 20.73 20.99 20.88 20.55 
2013 18.00 17.54 17.54 17.34 17.43 17.67 
2020 27.11 26.33 26.31 25.95 26.11 26.52 Mining 
2025 32.05 31.16 31.14 30.73 30.91 31.37 
2013 20.26 19.74 19.74 19.54 19.65 19.97 
2020 29.64 28.88 28.84 28.51 28.68 29.22 Low technology 
2025 34.65 33.78 33.72 33.34 33.54 34.20 
2013 18.55 17.71 17.63 17.21 17.38 17.83 
2020 28.30 26.78 26.62 25.83 26.14 26.96 Medium high technology 
2025 34.08 32.24 32.03 31.06 31.45 32.43 
2013 17.25 16.83 16.81 16.61 16.70 16.93 
2020 25.90 25.16 25.12 24.75 24.90 25.31 Medium low technology 
2025 30.59 29.70 29.65 29.20 29.39 29.88 
2013 19.72 18.98 18.79 18.29 18.45 19.20 
2020 27.55 26.51 26.21 25.50 25.74 27.03 High technology 
2025 31.70 30.56 30.19 29.40 29.66 31.27 
2013 15.48 15.40 15.31 15.17 15.19 15.34 
2020 23.18 23.09 22.98 22.82 22.85 23.04 Services 
2025 27.02 26.97 26.84 26.69 26.71 26.92 
2013 –0.83  0.29   0.25   0.65  0.42 –0.18 
2020  5.39  6.77   6.75   7.28  6.99   6.23 Public services 
2025  8.12  9.62   9.61 10.19  9.88   9.05 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod; own calculations. 
 
In this dynamic environment of decreased production unit cost and increased production 
capacities, exports compared to the baseline case would increase by 18.8% in 2013 and by 
33.5% in 2025 (see Table 5). Fast growth and increasing domestic demand implies higher 
import levels as well. These would increase compared to the baseline case by 15.8% in 
2013 and by 27.5% in 2025 (see Table 6). Given the fixed nominal exchange rate, the 
current account deficit generates foreign capital inflow, which additionally increases total 
savings and thus the source of investment funds. However, thanks to increased exports the 
current account deficit would decline with respect to its baseline level. 
 
Table 5. Real exports (percentage change in comparison to BAU) 
Scenario 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2020 2025 
Reference scenario 4.46 7.66 10.07 12.19 14.47 16.68 18.78 28.14 33.46 
Scenario SC1 4.40 7.39 9.69 11.73 13.91 16.03 18.05 26.91 31.99 
Scenario SC2 4.42 7.39 9.68 11.70 13.88 15.99 18.00 26.80 31.86 
Scenario SC3 4.42 7.27 9.52 11.49 13.61 15.68 17.65 26.18 31.11 
Scenario SC4 4.43 7.33 9.59 11.59 13.73 15.82 17.80 26.44 31.42 
Scenario SC5 4.44 7.48 9.80 11.85 14.05 16.19 18.22 27.17 32.30 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod; own calculations. 
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 Table 6. Real imports (percentage change in comparison to BAU) 
Scenario 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2020 2025 
Reference scenario 4.74 6.55 8.46 10.29 12.39 14.21 15.83 23.62 27.52 
Scenario SC1 4.39 6.29 8.16 9.97 12.04 13.83 15.43 23.15 27.04 
Scenario SC2 4.30 6.21 8.07 9.87 11.93 13.72 15.31 23.00 26.88 
Scenario SC3 4.06 6.00 7.84 9.62 11.67 13.44 15.02 22.66 26.52 
Scenario SC4 4.14 6.06 7.91 9.70 11.75 13.52 15.11 22.77 26.64 
Scenario SC5 4.43 6.30 8.17 9.98 12.06 13.85 15.45 23.18 27.06 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod; own calculations. 
 
The public sector’s relative weight in the economy would decline in all the scenarios and 
the private sector would expand at an even faster rate. The current public consumption 
compared to the baseline case would decline by 6.2% in 2013 (see Table 7). However, in 
the long run (2025) the public sector would expand compared to the baseline thanks to 
higher growth and increasing tax revenues. Given the anticipated 4% decrease in the public 
expenditure to GDP ratio, the share of the public sector in the economy would remain at a 
lower level compared to the baseline case. 
 
Table 7. Real government consumption (percentage change in comparison to BAU) 
Scenario 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2020 2025 
Reference scenario 0.35 –4.83 –3.99 –3.46 –3.66 –4.77 –6.20 –0.37 2.10 
Scenario SC1 0.80 –4.01 –3.13 –2.57 –2.73 –3.83 –5.25   0.85 3.44 
Scenario SC2 0.74 –4.05 –3.16 –2.61 –2.77 –3.86 –5.29   0.84 3.44 
Scenario SC3 0.83 –3.78 –2.88 –2.31 –2.46 –3.55 –4.96   1.30 3.97 
Scenario SC4 0.73 –3.95 –3.06 –2.50 –2.66 –3.74 –5.16   1.05 3.69 
Scenario SC5 0.53 –4.38 –3.51 –2.96 –3.14 –4.23 –5.65   0.38 2.94 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod; own calculations. 
 
Even if employment in the public sector shrank by 1.5% in 2013 because of contractionary 
expenditure policy during the transition period, it would expand by more than 1% in the 
long run (2025) compared to the baseline case (see Table 8). Total employment would 
increase thanks to the strong expansion of the private sector and increasing labour supply. 
The total labour supply would increase by 1.4% in 2013 and by 2.5% in 2025 thanks to 
increasing real wages. The increase in the labour supply of highly skilled people would be 
particularly strong (2.2% in 2013 and 3.8% in 2025). Employment increase is significant in 
manufacturing (more than 10% in 2013 and almost 20% in 2025 in some sectors) and 
services (see Table 9). The expansion in the high technology sectors is especially vigorous 
(13% in 2013 and 16.1% in 2025). Employment increase compared to the baseline case is 
evident even in agriculture (2.9% in 2013 and 5.6% in 2025). 
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 Table 8. Labour market effects 
Labour market category Year BAU  REF  SC1  SC2   SC3   SC4   SC5 
2013 10.71   5.41   5.49   5.57   5.68   5.66   5.55 
2020 10.71   3.86   3.92   3.99   4.09   4.07   3.97 Unemployment rate, all skills (in per cent) 
2025 10.71   3.23   3.29   3.35   3.44   3.42   3.33 
2013 19.82 12.00 12.18 12.32 12.51 12.46 12.24 
2020 19.82   9.53   9.71   9.85 10.04   9.99   9.76 Unemployment rate, unskilled (in per cent) 
2025 19.82   8.40   8.58   8.72   8.90   8.85   8.62 
2013   9.95   4.56   4.60   4.68   4.80   4.79   4.69 
2020   9.95   2.96   2.99   3.05   3.15   3.14   3.06 Unemployment rate, skilled (in per cent) 
2025   9.95   2.34   2.37   2.42   2.50   2.50   2.42 
2013   2.98   0.79   0.90   0.89    0.91   0.89   0.84 
2020   2.98   0.40   0.46   0.46   0.47   0.46   0.43 Unemployment rate, highly skilled (in per cent) 
2025   2.98   0.28   0.33   0.32   0.34   0.33   0.30 
2013 129,134 66,177 67,252 68,237 69,710 69,456 67,947 
2020 169,932 62,522 63,690 64,828 66,484 66,190 64,410 Number of unemployed, total 
2025 206,748 63,900 65,153 66,425 68,225 67,902 65,883 
2013    1.42   1.65   1.71   1.85   1.80   1.63 
2020    2.09   2.31   2.37   2.50   2.45   2.29 Labour supply, total (% change in comparison to BAU) 
2025    2.45   2.67   2.72   2.85   2.80   2.64 
2013    0.80   0.75   0.89   0.96   0.96   0.88 
2020    1.15   1.10   1.23   1.29   1.30   1.22 Labour supply, unskilled (% change in comparison to BAU) 
2025    1.34   1.28   1.41   1.48   1.48   1.41 
2013    1.37   1.50   1.59   1.74   1.72   1.58 
2020    2.03   2.15   2.24   2.39   2.36   2.23 Labour supply, skilled (% change in comparison to BAU) 
2025    2.39   2.51   2.59   2.74   2.72   2.59 
2013    2.24   3.08   2.96   3.13   2.95   2.59 
2020    3.29   4.11   3.99   4.15   3.98   3.62 Labour supply, highly skilled (% change in comparison to BAU) 
2025    3.83   4.64   4.52   4.68   4.51   4.16 
Real wage growth rate, unskilled (in per cent) 2007-2013    0.62   0.61   0.60   0.59   0.59   0.61 
Real wage growth rate, skilled (in per cent) 2007-2013    0.97   0.96   0.95   0.93   0.93   0.95 
Real wage growth rate, highly skilled (in per cent) 2007-2013    1.58   1.50   1.49   1.46   1.48   1.53 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod; own calculations. 
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 As a consequence of significant job creation, unemployment would decline (see Table 8). 
The overall unemployment rate would decline from 10.7% in 2004 to 5.4% in 2013, and to 
only 3.2% in 2025. The unemployment rate among unskilled workers (i.e. with completed 
elementary school) would more than halve, declining from 19.8% in 2004 to 8.4% in 2025. 
Among skilled and highly skilled workers, the decline in the unemployment rate would be 
even more impressive; among skilled workers the unemployment rate would fall from 
almost 10% in 2004 to 4.6% in 2013 and to 2.3% in 2025, and among highly skilled 
workers it would be almost completely eliminated (decrease from 3% in 2004 to only 0.3% 
in 2025). 
 
Table 9. Employment (percentage change in comparison to BAU) 
Industry Year REF SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 
2013   2.90   3.50   3.58   3.88   3.76   3.35 
2020   4.37   4.48   4.45   4.47   4.46   4.48 Agriculture 
2025   5.62   5.72   5.68   5.69   5.67   5.73 
2013   9.98   9.69   9.72   9.63   9.69   9.82 
2020 13.36 12.90 12.94 12.78 12.88 13.09 Mining 
2025 15.13 14.61 14.66 14.49 14.59 14.83 
2013 13.20 12.80 12.85 12.75 12.84 13.04 
2020 17.10 16.60 16.66 16.53 16.64 16.92 Low technology 
2025 19.03 18.49 18.55 18.41 18.53 18.87 
2013 12.86 12.09 12.05 11.69 11.85 12.23 
2020 17.04 15.74 15.65 15.01 15.27 15.93 Medium high technology 
2025 19.69 18.15 18.04 17.28 17.60 18.35 
2013 10.76 10.47 10.49 10.39 10.45 10.57 
2020 13.80 13.36 13.40 13.23 13.32 13.49 Medium low technology 
2025 15.35 14.82 14.87 14.67 14.78 14.97 
2013 13.20 12.53 12.34 11.87 12.01 12.69 
2020 15.20 14.43 14.18 13.63 13.80 14.81 High technology 
2025 16.12 15.35 15.07 14.49 14.67 15.86 
2013   8.04   8.56 8.52 8.68 8.58 8.34 
2020   9.84 10.59 10.59 10.88 10.72 10.34 Services 
2025 10.31 11.16 11.17 11.51 11.34 10.90 
2013 –1.45 –0.96 –1.08 –1.04 –1.14 –1.31 
2020   0.26   0.72   0.57   0.57   0.48   0.37 Public services 
2025   1.18   1.63   1.48   1.46   1.37   1.28 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod; own calculations. 
 
Productivity growth, increased labour demand, and a significant decline in the 
unemployment rate should result in higher real wages and higher real income. The increase 
is particularly strong for highly skilled workers and amounts to 1.6% per year on average 
by 2013 (see Table 8). It is also strong for skilled workers (1.0% per year on average). The 
increase in real household income with respect to the baseline case (between 9.6% for the 
first quintile and 15% for the fifth quintile in 2013, and respectively 19.8% and 27.4% in 
2025) should produce a significant boost in private consumption (around 20% for all the 
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 categories in 2025) and savings (see Table 11). Savings would increase given higher real 
return on capital. 
 
5.2. Counterfactual Scenarios 
 
A comparative analysis of the simulation results for the tax reform scenarios, which 
upgrade the reference scenario, shows that they also generate considerable growth, income, 
employment, welfare, and exports compared the baseline case. The positive impacts of 
suggested tax reforms scenarios on growth and employment would however be small 
compared to the reference scenario. 
 
In 2013, the real GDP growth is thus positive in all the tax reform scenarios, whereas the 
differences are very small (see Tables 2 and 10) and decrease even more in the long run; 
by 2025 these differences remain positive only for the two flat tax scenarios and the last 
scenario with three tax brackets. Reasons for this can be found in the accelerated economic 
growth in the first year of reduced income tax, in which the strongest effect (0.37 
percentage points) would be achieved by applying two income tax rates. However, it must 
be stressed that in time, the (relatively small) differences between these scenarios decrease 
even more. Private GDP fluctuations are similar; the differences are small and decrease 
over time. The flat tax scenarios seem to perform better in the long run, but the differences 
are again relatively small. The simulation results thus show that tax reform will not have 
any major impact on Slovenian economic growth12. 
 
                                                 
12 It has to be emphasized that individual scenarios have various impacts on income and welfare of the 
population, which will be analyzed later in this chapter and in the following chapter. 
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 Table 10. Macroeconomic aggregates (in mill SIT) 
Macroeconomic category Year      BAU      REF      SC1     SC2      SC3     SC4     SC5 
2013 8,895,752 10,088,261 10,104,167 10,100,235 10,101,272 10,098,223 10,093,681 
2020 11,706,203 14,186,957 14,200,571 14,192,434 14,187,900 14,185,869 14,188,093 Real GDP 
2025 14,242,386 17,830,178 17,844,943 17,833,243 17,825,803 17,823,923 17,830,611 
2013 6,872,775 8,145,655 8,145,898 8,142,756 8,138,704 8,138,920 8,142,355 
2020 9,044,103 11,465,910 11,454,337 11,447,101 11,433,735 11,436,895 11,452,339 Real private GDP 
2025 11,003,534 14,428,197 14,409,801 14,399,139 14,379,704 14,384,632 14,408,951 
2013 5,197,180 5,887,158 5,962,645 5,967,122 6,000,960 5,985,397 5,940,735 
2020 6,839,135 8,260,154 8,360,502 8,364,624 8,407,464 8,387,169 8,330,932 Private consumption 
2025 8,320,853 10,379,645 10,504,771 10,508,773 10,561,299 10,536,134 10,468,278 
2013 1,735,157 1,627,536 1,644,031 1,643,442 1,649,087 1,645,641 1,637,049 
2020 2,283,349 2,274,819 2,302,804 2,302,512 2,313,119 2,307,312 2,292,000 Public consumption 
2025 2,778,043 2,836,273 2,873,657 2,873,557 2,888,220 2,880,484 2,859,622 
2013 2,338,339 2,863,038 2,801,296 2,789,798 2,753,155 2,766,348 2,812,128 
2020 3,077,095 3,969,554 3,901,574 3,886,739 3,845,032 3,859,790 3,914,725 Investment 
2025 3,743,757 4,912,929 4,839,227 4,821,339 4,775,040 4,791,239 4,854,829 
2013 4,911,025 5,833,318 5,797,546 5,795,122 5,777,834 5,785,290 5,805,985 
2020 6,462,574 8,281,164 8,201,626 8,194,569 8,154,480 8,171,185 8,218,721 Real exports 
2025 7,862,709 10,493,474 10,378,365 10,367,384 10,308,959 10,333,166 10,402,526 
2013 5,285,950 6,122,789 6,101,351 6,095,249 6,079,764 6,084,454 6,102,216 
2020 6,955,950 8,598,734 8,565,935 8,556,009 8,532,196 8,539,587 8,568,284 Real imports 
2025 8,462,976 10,792,142 10,751,077 10,737,810 10,707,715 10,717,100 10,754,645 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod; own calculations. 
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 The impacts of individual tax scenarios on domestic production demonstrate a decrease 
compared to the reference scenario, except for public services (see Table 4). Except in the 
services sector, this also results in a lower employment increase (see Table 9). 
 
Reduced income tax should result in an additional increase in after-tax real wages 
compared to the reference scenario. This also results in an increased labour supply (see 
Table 8). However, given the increasing government budget deficit in the first years of the 
tax reform due to declining tax revenues, the economic environment is less favourable for 
the private sector; the real private GDP increase is lower even if the total real GDP is 
slightly higher (see Tables 2 and 10). The government temporarily spends too much 
compared to the reference scenario (see Table 13). National savings decrease because of 
temporarily higher current government deficits even if household savings are higher; in the 
short run government deficits would crowd out personal investment, which increases much 
less than in the initial period of the reference case (see Tables 3 and 11). However, the gap 
narrows in the long run due to the government budget surplus. 
 
On the other hand, increased household disposable income should result in increased 
household consumption; again, the highest increase will be in the fifth quintile. The 
differences between individual scenarios concern the differences in the lower income tax 
paid (see Table 11). In the SC5 scenario, the increase in personal consumption is lower 
compared to other scenarios because households gain relatively less. This is also reflected 
in lower labour supply increase as the result of a smaller decrease in effective PIT rates 
compared to other scenarios (see Tables 8 and 12). 
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 Table 11. Income, consumption and saving of households (percentage change 
in comparison to BAU) 
 
Income category Year REF SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 
2013   9.64   9.73   9.52   9.40   9.41   9.59 
2020 16.36 16.40 16.15 15.98 16.00 16.26 Household income, 1. quintile 
2025 19.84 19.87 19.60 19.42 19.45 19.74 
2013 12.12 12.11 11.93 11.77 11.79 11.98 
2020 19.20 19.13 18.92 18.70 18.73 19.01 Household income, 2. quintile 
2025 22.89 22.82 22.58 22.34 22.38 22.70 
2013 12.98 12.92 12.77 12.61 12.63 12.83 
2020 20.35 20.22 20.03 19.81 19.85 20.14 Household income, 3. quintile 
2025 24.21 24.06 23.86 23.61 23.66 23.99 
2013 13.50 13.40 13.27 13.12 13.15 13.36 
2020 21.18 20.99 20.83 20.61 20.67 20.97 Household income, 4. quintile 
2025 25.20 24.99 24.81 24.57 24.64 24.98 
2013 15.02 15.24 14.90 14.85 14.87 15.15 
2020 23.17 23.31 22.93 22.82 22.87 23.25 Household income, 5. quintile 
2025 27.35 27.47 27.08 26.95 27.01 27.42 
        
Consumption category Year REF SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 
2013 10.98 10.99 11.35 11.21 11.23 11.12 
2020 17.76 17.71 18.07 17.87 17.90 17.86 Household consumption budget, 1. quintile 2025 21.30 21.23 21.60 21.38 21.42 21.40 
2013 13.90 13.56 14.37 14.50 14.54 14.18 
2020 21.06 20.63 21.46 21.54 21.59 21.31 Household consumption budget, 2. quintile 2025 24.84 24.39 25.23 25.30 25.36 25.10 
2013 14.72 14.32 15.06 15.74 15.78 15.32 
2020 22.15 21.64 22.39 23.06 23.12 22.73 Household consumption budget, 3. quintile 2025 26.10 25.57 26.33 27.00 27.07 26.70 
2013 14.63 15.14 15.45 16.58 16.61 15.96 
2020 22.31 22.78 23.08 24.22 24.27 23.68 Household consumption budget, 4. quintile 2025 26.37 26.85 27.14 28.31 28.37 27.79 
2013 12.09 16.42 15.60 16.41 15.47 13.78 
2020 19.90 24.44 23.54 24.33 23.34 21.63 Household consumption budget, 5. quintile 2025 23.99 28.69 27.74 28.54 27.52 25.78 
        
Saving category Year REF SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 
2013 22.71 25.14 24.71 25.03 24.85 24.70 
2020 30.38 33.21 32.81 33.31 33.06 32.67 Household saving, 1. quintile 
2025 33.43 36.42 36.04 36.62 36.35 35.84 
2013 26.56 28.60 28.78 29.73 29.56 29.00 
2020 34.68 37.13 37.38 38.56 38.31 37.48 Household saving, 2. quintile 
2025 37.97 40.57 40.86 42.13 41.86 40.90 
2013 27.64 29.73 29.66 31.67 31.49 30.76 
2020 36.08 38.57 38.55 40.87 40.62 39.61 Household saving, 3. quintile 
2025 39.53 42.19 42.20 44.64 44.37 43.22 
2013 26.34 29.98 29.11 31.80 31.60 30.59 
2020 34.98 39.13 38.25 41.29 41.03 39.71 Household saving, 4. quintile 
2025 38.55 42.90 42.03 45.22 44.93 43.47 
2013 21.65 33.19 30.07 32.38 30.18 26.83 
2020 30.28 42.94 39.65 42.31 39.88 36.02 Household saving, 5. quintile 
2025 33.78 46.89 43.55 46.35 43.82 39.73 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod; own calculations. 
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 Given that household and government demands are higher in the tax reform scenarios than 
in the reference scenario, prices would be higher as well compared to the reference 
scenario. This exerts a negative impact on exports, which are lower than in the reference 
scenario (see Tables 5 and 10). Of course the final result depends on changes resulting 
from reduced investment demand, reduced production of capital goods, and the relative 
decrease in the capital goods’ prices compared to the reference scenario. Imports would 
also follow the changes in domestic market; taking into account the fixed exchange rate, as 
well as the current (given) world prices, they would result accordingly in an increase or a 
decrease (see Tables 6 and 10). The final result of all the changes shows that in the 
aggregate, imports would decrease, although less than exports. This would result in an 
increased current account deficit and increased external savings and partial replacement of 
the decreased domestic savings that would result from decreased budget revenues and 
covering these with a temporarily increased budget deficit. 
 
Table 12. Effective average PIT rates in 2013 (in per cent) 
Effective average PIT rate REF SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 
1. quintile, unskilled 11.01 13.41 17.14 9.40 9.40 9.53 
1. quintile, skilled 14.60 18.47 21.12 13.42 13.42 13.93 
1. quintile, highly skilled 15.73 18.16 20.25 14.37 14.37 14.62 
2. quintile, unskilled 11.74 14.40 17.72 10.07 10.07 10.38 
2. quintile, skilled 15.38 19.09 21.91 13.79 13.79 14.33 
2. quintile, highly skilled 18.43 19.30 21.93 15.58 15.58 16.17 
3. quintile, unskilled 12.26 15.07 18.03 10.67 10.67 11.01 
3. quintile, skilled 16.24 19.03 21.90 14.17 14.17 14.61 
3. quintile, highly skilled 20.16 19.64 22.41 16.54 16.58 17.31 
4. quintile, unskilled 13.22 14.90 17.48 11.14 11.16 11.45 
4. quintile, skilled 17.84 18.61 21.39 14.90 14.92 15.37 
4. quintile, highly skilled 22.14 19.49 22.27 17.44 17.52 18.80 
5. quintile, unskilled 14.84 13.67 16.02 11.41 11.75 12.66 
5. quintile, skilled 22.53 18.71 21.49 17.09 17.89 19.58 
5. quintile, highly skilled 29.50 20.21 23.08 20.46 22.80 26.30 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod; own calculations. 
 
A comparison of the results of scenarios SC1 through SC5 shows that in the SC5 scenario, 
the impact on increasing investment is greater than in the other scenarios (see Tables 8 and 
10). The difference is especially evident compared to scenarios with two or three tax 
brackets (i.e. SC3 and SC4). Similar findings apply to foreign trade (see Tables 5 and 6). 
Employment in the SC5 scenario compared to other scenarios is a specific case; it is higher 
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 in manufacturing and slightly lower in agriculture and services (see Table 9). Similar 
results apply to changes in domestic production13 (see Table 4). 
 
Given the assumptions of budget deficit (surplus) adjustment and gradual decrease of the 
share of GDP expenditure, the budget deficit gradually decreases and converts into a 
surplus (see Table 13). Only with the full implementation of the government expenditure 
decrease could all the scenarios could be implemented without raising VAT. However, if 
the assumed decrease in government expenditure was not fully implemented in practice, it 
would be necessary to appropriately increase the VAT rates, which would result in 
increased prices and other appurtenant effects. 
 
Table 13. Government budget (change in GDP percentage points in comparison to BAU) 
Government budget category Year REF SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5
2013 0.85 –0.35 –0.16 –0.59 –0.39 0.03
2020 0.85 –0.35 –0.15 –0.58 –0.38 0.04Total government revenues 
2025 0.82 –0.37 –0.18 –0.61 –0.41 0.02
2013 –4.00 –4.00 –4.00 –4.00 –4.00 –4.00
2020 –4.00 –4.00 –4.00 –4.00 –4.00 –4.00Total government expenditures 
2025 –4.00 –4.00 –4.00 –4.00 –4.00 –4.00
2013 4.85 3.65 3.84 3.41 3.61 4.03
2020 4.85 3.65 3.85 3.42 3.62 4.04Government deficit 
2025 4.82 3.63 3.82 3.39 3.59 4.02
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod; own calculations. 
 
Additional simulations were performed, in which the two VAT rates or the (single) flat 
VAT rate were adjusting according to the assumed government budget changes. This 
meant that VAT rates increased in the case of a budget deficit and decrease in the case of a 
budget surplus. The simulations of the proposed tax reform scenarios, which assumed the 
adjustment of two VAT rates or a flat VAT rate, gradual budget deficit elimination, and a 
decrease in government expenditure, demonstrated that the required VAT increase would 
have strong short-term negative impacts on economic growth. In the first year of the tax 
reform, there would be no increase in growth, but a decrease at a level between 3.2% and 
3.9%. At the same time, higher VAT rates in all the quintiles would neutralize the positive 
effects of the tax reform on household welfare (except for the fifth quintile in the case of a 
flat tax rate). 
 
                                                 
13 It is evident that greater differences again appear primarily compared to the scenarios with two or three 
income tax brackets (i.e. SC3 and SC4). 
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 6. Welfare Results of the Simulations 
 
The results shown in the previous chapter reveal that the different scenarios do not differ 
much from each other regarding the impact on macroeconomic aggregates. However, from 
the individual taxpayer’s point of view, the accepted PIT code (SC5) changes the income 
position of practically all households and individual taxpayers. 
 
The reference scenario shows that all the income and skill groups would win from 
structural reforms and higher growth (see Tables 11 and 14). The distribution of the 
income and welfare gains among the different categories of the population is however not 
uniform. It is obvious that highly skilled workers and the fifth quintile would be the big 
winners. The present value of welfare gains for the fifth quintile would be 5,247 billion 
SIT. The gain for the first quintile would be 1,569 billion SIT. Real income for the first 
quintile would increase by 9.6% in 2013 and by 19.8% in 2025, whereas the increase for 
the fifth quintile would be 15% in 2013 and 25.4% in 2025. 
 
Table 14. Welfare effects 
Welfare category REF SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 
1. quintile, mill SIT 1,569,386 1,564,864 1,599,135 1,581,082 1,584,029 1,579,394
2. quintile, mill SIT 2,521,773 2,469,767 2,573,069 2,585,223 2,591,296 2,554,513
3. quintile, mill SIT 3,240,703 3,167,129 3,282,664 3,386,221 3,394,996 3,333,138
4. quintile, mill SIT 3,928,499 4,021,773 4,077,758 4,292,879 4,300,465 4,186,397
5. quintile, mill SIT 5,247,769 6,547,105 6,294,815 6,528,106 6,246,256 5,750,708
1. quintile, % of household income 12.88 12.84 13.14 13.01 13.03 12.97 
2. quintile, % of household income 14.19 13.90 14.51 14.60 14.63 14.39 
3. quintile, % of household income 14.21 13.90 14.42 14.90 14.94 14.64 
4. quintile, % of household income 14.26 14.61 14.84 15.64 15.66 15.22 
5. quintile, % of household income 11.27 14.04 13.53 14.05 13.43 12.34 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod; own calculations. 
 
In the case of a flat tax rate according to the first counterfactual scenario (SC1), welfare 
gains compared to the reference case would decline for the first three quintiles, which is a 
result of higher income tax paid, because even increased general PIT allowance would not 
be able to supplement the higher effective PIT rates. At the same time, the welfare gains of 
the households in the fourth quintile would slightly increase, whereas in the fifth quintile 
they would increase considerably (see Table 14). 
 
In the remaining four counterfactual scenarios, the combination of PIT allowances and 
envisaged PIT rates is such that even the households in lower quintiles would pay less 
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 income tax than in the reference scenario. This is also shown in increased welfare across 
all the quintiles, but again, the fifth quintile would win the most. Given the changes in the 
welfare structure the last scenario with three tax rates (SC5) seems the most appropriate, 
since a lower increase in the welfare gains for the fifth quintile means that the remaining 
quintiles receive a bigger share of welfare gains (welfare increases relatively the most in 
the second, third, and fourth quintiles). From the social point of view, this scenario seems 
to be the most acceptable. However, given the size of the welfare gains alone, the scenario 
with two tax brackets (SC3) seems to be the most appropriate, which is also confirmed by 
the calculation of the present value of welfare changes for individual scenarios (PVW) in 
Table 16. 
 
However, it needs to be emphasized that this calculation depends on scenario assumptions 
and that the scenario with two tax brackets (SC3) is the one that reduces the payment of 
PIT the most (households gain almost 100 billion SIT per year). Actually, as the results 
from Table 15 reveal, all the counterfactual scenarios examined lead to a substantial drop 
in government revenues compared with the reference case; the relative decrease in 
revenues ranges between 10.9% (SC5) and 27.4% (SC3). Assuming the same income 
pattern as in 2004, the government could expect 10.9% less revenue from PIT under the 
PIT-2007 tax code (SC5) compared with the reference tax code. The scenarios also differ 
regarding the relative taxation of income quintiles. For example, the lowest income quintile 
under the counterfactual scenario SC1 would pay 1.4% more PIT compared with the 
reference system. 
 
Table 15. Amount of PIT under different counterfactual scenarios in comparison with the 
reference case (REF = 100, household level) 
 
Quintile  SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 
1 101.4 72.3 73.4 73.4 88.3 
2 104.9 83.2 76.0 76.0 88.3 
3 103.6 90.9 77.8 77.9 87.0 
4   94.0 89.9 77.0 77.2 .7 
5   71.9 76.0 70.1 76.6 .8 
All   81.5 80.4 72.6 76.8 9.1 
84
90
8
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod and the microsimulation model; own calculations. 
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 Finally, all the scenarios increase income inequality in Slovenian society to a greater or 
lesser degree. In Table 16, the consequences of different PIT scenarios are assessed at the 
household and individual levels. Three different measures were used (cf. Cowel, 1977): (1) 
the Gini coefficient (G), (2) the Atkinson index (A), and (3) the squared coefficient of 
variation (SCV). They all reveal that the overall inequality under all counterfactual 
scenarios grew in comparison to the reference scenario. In addition, it can be concluded, as 
already foreseen on the basis of welfare gains distribution, that the flat tax scenarios (SC1 
and SC2) would increase income inequality in Slovenia to a greater extent than scenarios 
with several tax rates (SC3 through SC5). 
 
Table 16. Welfare variation measure and income inequality measures, based on household 
equivalent disposable income (household level) 
 
Measure REF SC1 SC2 SC3 SC4 SC5 
PVW 16,508,130 17,770,638 17,827,440 18,373,510 18,117,042 17,390,967 
Index (REF = 100)  107.6 108.0 111.3 109.7 105.3 
G 0.2730 0.2895 0.2896 0.2851 0.2876 0.2785 
Index (REF = 100)  106.0 106.1 104.4 105.3 102.0 
A 2ε =  0.2523 0.2686 0.2686 0.2650 0.2689 0.2594 
Index (REF = 100)  106.5 106.5 105.0 106.6 102.8 
SCV 0.3024 0.3849 0.3852 0.3664 0.3688 0.3210 
Index (REF = 100)  127.3 127.4 121.2 122.0 106.2 
Source: Authors’ simulations with SloMod and the microsimulation model; own calculations. 
 
7. Concluding Remarks 
 
In 2005-2006 a broad discussion emerged in Slovenia regarding its tax system. It was 
characterised by claims that the tax system needed simplifications and the effective 
reduction of taxation on labour. Among the different proposals, a flat-tax system similar to 
the Slovakian one with a single (and same) tax rate for PIT, CIT and VAT divided public 
opinion and was later rejected in particular by labour unions. 
 
In the article we have analyzed several envisaged tax and structural reform scenarios using 
a dynamic general equilibrium model of the Slovenian economy. The simulation results 
show that the main engine of growth, employment, and welfare is the total factor 
productivity growth thanks to increasing R&D investment and education, as well the 
declining share of the government in the economy, so that more resources become 
available for the private sector as the principal actor of  investment and growth. It has been 
shown that the simulation results show that the envisaged tax reform packages would have 
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 positive impacts on economic growth, labour markets, and household welfare. However, 
flat tax scenarios show that the distributive impacts among different income groups and 
skills might be substantial. In some tax reform scenarios the low-income groups might lose 
and the high-income and high skill groups might win a lot. Thus our results suggested that 
options other than the Slovakian-like flat tax system are better suited to the country’s long-
term economic development. 
 
The finally adopted tax reform, effective from January 2007, includes new PIT and CIT 
codes, new tax procedure rules, the gradual abolition of payroll tax and several changes to 
less important taxes, e.g. the inheritance tax. Among the major changes of the PIT and CIT 
codes one should emphasize the reduction of the highest marginal PIT rate from 50% to 
41%, schedular 20% taxation of interest, dividends and capital gains, and the reduction of 
statutory CIT rate from 25% to 20%. In comparison with several CEEC countries that 
decided in favour of more radical approaches14, Slovenia has thus once again decided on a 
more gradual approach. Namely, as our results show, the consequences of the reform are 
relatively modest and give benefits to practically all taxpayers, while they harm the 
government budget in the short run. However, by introducing several of these changes, 
such as the reduction of the highest marginal PIT rate and the schedular taxation of capital 
income, Slovenia has merely taken a step closer to the common EU practice. 
 
                                                 
14  For example Croatia, which (temporarily) introduced a consumption-based tax PIT (cf. Blažić, 1999), or 
many Central and Eastern European countries that opted for a flat-tax concept of the PIT. 
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